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I. INTRODUCTION 
This note looks to the history of the Republic of South Africa’s (South Africa) 
patent law system,
1
 the present state of South Africa’s patent system, and the 
effect its patent system has had on the country.
2
 The goal of this note is to develop 




II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PATENT SYSTEM 
A. Brief History of Colonial South Africa  
In the mid-seventeenth century, settlers from the Netherlands colonized the 
Western Cape of South Africa.
4
  In 1806, the British defeated the Dutch settlers 
and claimed the Cape for the British Empire.
5
  The current laws of South Africa 
reflect this successive colonial governance.
6
  “The ‘common law’ of the country 
(in this context, ‘common law’ implies law of non-statutory origin) is based on 
the ‘Roman-Dutch’ law of the original Dutch settlers.”
7
 
When the British Empire took the Cape of South Africa in 1806, they did not 
impose their legal system, at least not completely.
8
  Instead, the existing Roman-
Dutch common-law remained in force, but was eventually “overlaid with a heavy 
English law influence.”
9
  The English influence included enacting English 
procedural law, basing statutory acts on English acts, and interpreting statutes 
with relevant English precedent.
10
  Advocates and judges of the courts were 
usually trained in England as well.
11
   
Nearly one hundred years later, after the South African Anglo-Boer War that 
                                                        
1
 See infra Part II. 
2
 See infra Part III. 
3
 See infra Part IV. 
4
 Amanda Barratt & Pamela Snyman, Researching South African Law, GLOBALEX (Mar. 
2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/South_Africa.htm. 
5
 See MICHAEL MORRIS, EVERY STEP OF THE WAY: THE JOURNEY TO FREEDOM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 72 (John Linnegar ed., 2004) ("[B]efore Britain returned at the second occupation in 1806 
for an extended and decisively influential stay - the Cape was regarded as being what Penn has 
described as 'a British Responsibility'."); Barratt & Snyman, supra note 4. 
6
 Barratt & Snyman, supra note 4. 
7
 Id.  Many of the primary sources of South African law stemmed from Roman law as 
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ended in 1902, Britain took control of the entirety of South Africa.
12
  In 1910, 
Britain unified the four territories of South Africa.
13
 During the unification 




The resulting South African legal system is regarded as a true hybrid of both 
English law and Roman-Dutch legal principles.
15
  However, South Africa’s laws 
do not completely ignore native heritage.
16
  A “Native Administration” policy 
developed during English governance allowed indigenous people to “rule 
themselves according to indigenous law in certain matters.”
17
  This plural legal 
system exists today with the limitation that the Native Administration rulings may 
not preempt the South African Constitution.
18
 
When the National Party took control of the government in 1948, the long 
existing segregationist policies of apartheid became the official South African 
government policy.
19
  During Apartheid, the population was classified in racial 
groups and geographically segregated; the extent of the segregation included 
nearly every aspect of life: education, health services, employment, and public 
amenities.
20
  Many South Africans lost their citizenship and were forced into 
separate states outside of ‘white South Africa.’
21
  As resistance to the apartheid 
regime grew, the South African government implemented laws giving the state 
powers to detain, arrest, imprison, and ban its opponents.
22
 
In 1990, the government began negotiations with its opponents, which 
resulted in the Interim Constitution.
23
  In 1994, democratic elections led to Nelson 
                                                        
12
 Jim Jones, South Africa in the 19th Century, W. CHESTER U., 
http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his312/lectures/southafr.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2012); Barratt & 
Snyman, supra note 4. 
13
 Barratt & Snyman, supra note 4. The four South African territories unified were: the Cape, 






 Barratt & Snyman, supra note 4. 
17
 Id. “The colonial state retained exclusive jurisdiction over matters such as serious crime.  
Matters of customary law were heard by chiefs and headmen, with a right of appeal to the Native 






 LAUREL BALDWIN-RAGAVEN ET AL., AN AMBULANCE OF THE WRONG COLOUR: HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 18–19 (1999); Barratt & Snyman, 
supra note 4. 
21




 S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993; South Africa: The Presidency of Nelson Mandela (1994-
1999), ELECTORAL INST. FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN AFR., 
4
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Mandela’s election as President.
24
  Three years later, a final constitution was 
enacted into law with a Bill of Rights.
25
 
The Republic of South Africa’s relation to Europe through colonization and 
adoption of their legal and political structures is an important backdrop that helps 
to explain South Africa’s international intellectual property policy.  A policy that 
for the last two decades has arguably strayed away from what is in the country’s 
best interests. 
B. Balancing Justifications for and Against a Patent System 
In industrialized nations, such as the United States, the pro-patent sentiment 
outweighs any human rights argument against patent protection.  The economic 
prosperity in industrial nations makes them ideal candidates for a patent system, 
as the population is capable of absorbing the economic costs of more costly goods 
due to patent-based monopolies.  The net gain for these industrialized nations is 
an improved standard of living. 
However, in third-world-developing countries, such as South Africa, is 
adopting an international patent system truly advantageous to the nation’s 
economy, or is South Africa playing with the “big boys” at a detriment to their 
country’s well-being?  It is the view of this author, based on the analysis to 
follow, that South Africa has entered the international intellectual property rights 
arena at its own detriment.
26
  Particularly important to this analysis of South 
Africa’s patent system is a discussion of factors that make South Africa unique 
among fellow third-world countries entering the international patent arena, 
including the HIV/AIDS epidemic and extreme poverty.
27
   
1. Policy Justifications for a Patent System 
There are essentially two broad justifications for patenting.  One is based on 
the natural right of the inventor (fundamental justice), and the other justification is 
based on a discretionary act of the sovereign (economic justice).
28
   
Under the natural right of fundamental justice, “justice inherently requires 
society to transfer to the inventor the right of control.”
29
  This is due to an 
                                                        
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/souoverview8.htm (last updated Feb. 2011); Barratt & Snyman, 
supra note 4. 
24
 Barratt & Snyman, supra note 4. 
25
 S. AFR. CONST., 1996; Barratt & Snyman, supra note 4. 
26
 See infra Parts III–IV. 
27
 See infra Part II.B.3. 
28
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inventor’s inherent property right in their invention.
30
  The fundamental justice 
view is supported by Lockean theory that individuals own themselves, and by 
extension, the fruits of their labor.
31
  The association of labor and an item created 
by that labor thus creates a property interest in the creator.
32
  It follows that 
inventors should be granted a right to exclude others from the use of their 
invention via a patent system.   
Under the economic justification, the sovereign is acting on behalf of the 
public: “patent rights are given when the patenting transaction is one from which 
the public expects to benefit.  Where it seems that the public would suffer net 
losses, in contrast, the patent is denied.”
33
  The patent system under this 
justification is looked at as a tool to increase society’s welfare.
34
  Most often, this 
societal welfare is viewed in economic terms, the goal being to maximize 
society’s aggregate wealth.
35
   
“Dating back to ancient Greece, one can discern at least the idea of an 
incentive-based mechanism wherein a potential inventor is encouraged to disclose 
something new and useful to society.  The incentive could take the form of a prize 
reward or exclusive right in the inventor’s contribution.”
36
  The patent grant is 
intended to incentivize and “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”
37
  
This incentive spurs innovation, with the innovation ultimately benefitting the 
society that grants the patent.   
2. Policy Justifications Against a Patent System 
“The grant of patent rights is thought to impose a wide array of costs on 
society.”
38
  The most apparent cost is operating a government-run patent system.
39
  
In the United States, “the Federal Government incurs significant expenses to 
operate the patent-related portions of the Patent and Trademark Office.”
40
  A 
patent system also requires considerable resources from the legislative and 
                                                        
30
 Karen Vaughn, John Locke and the Labor Theory of Value, 2 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 311 
(1978), available at http://mises.org/journals/jls/2_4/2_4_3.pdf; see generally 1 MOY, supra note 
28, § 1:28. 
31
 Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1089–92 (1995); 1 
MOY, supra note 28, § 1:28. 
32
 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:28. 
33
 Id. § 1:26. 
34




 F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6 (4th ed. 2008). 
37
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
38
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  Patent-owning interests incur costs in using the system, 
including obtaining and retaining patents, licensing, and enforcing their patent 
rights.
42
  Accused infringers incur costs in defending themselves.
43
  The net result 
of these social costs is increased costs to the consumer, in the form of higher taxes 
and increased cost of consumer goods. 
Typically, goods in an open market are controlled by a standard supply and 
demand curve, which dictates price.
44
  If only a single source for a good exists, 
other sources will enter the market if the original source is artificially altering the 
supply and demand curve to induce a higher price and profit margin.
45
  A fully 
competitive market will self-correct until all suppliers’ selling prices of a 
particular good represents the goods’ cost of production, plus a normal rate of 
return.
46
   
When patent rights control goods, the above situation no longer applies.
47
  The 
patent owner in this case, by excluding others from supplying the goods to the 
market, may manipulate the supply that the market receives, maximizing profit.
48
  
This market manipulation is not corrected by the influx in additional suppliers as 
is seen in a fully competitive market.
49
  The patent owner controls all entrance 
into the market for their patent protected good until the end of their exclusivity 
period.
50
  The marketplace change that results from patent protection gives rise to 
two primary consequences.
51
   
The increase in price for the patent protected good results in a large transfer of 
wealth to the patent owner from consumers, exacerbating inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth.
52
  This wealth transfer can be even more harming to a 




 Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:14 
PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtaining-patent/id=14668/ (providing 
a modern example of all the costs associated with obtaining a United States Patent); 1 MOY, supra 
note 28, § 1:30. 
43
 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:30. 
44
 See generally MAKING WORLD DEVELOPMENT WORK: SCIENTIFIC ALTERNATIVES TO 






 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:31. 
48
 See generally Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 241 (1997); 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:31. 
49
 See 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:31; Schaafsma, supra note 48 at 248–49.  
50
 See 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:31; Schaafsma, supra note 48 at 248–49. 
51
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country’s economy when it benefits a foreign entity, “a prime motivation for 
some countries to deny or restrict the grant of patent rights to foreigners.”
53
    
As discussed above, the patent owner maximizes profit by manipulating the 
supply of the patented product that the market receives, the manipulation typically 
being a decreased supply of the goods.
54
  A fully competitive market represents 
the optimal rate at which the goods can be used by society; when patents protect a 
good, society’s use of the good becomes too low.
55
  Also, the patent acts as a 
barrier to entry for entities to which the advance is useful; this retards the growth 
of the entities within the industry the patent is useful.
56
  These factors combine to 
create the problem of social underutilization in which a society pays a heavy 
burden for a limited benefit.
57
  
One element of the heavy burden society pays is through the allocation of the 
undersupply of the patented good.
58
  The limited supplies of goods are sold to 
those who are willing to pay the most.
59
  Therefore, “that system will allocate the 
decreased supply of the patented goods to the wealthiest portions of society, and 
impose the under supply on the portion that is least wealthy.”
60
  In the case where 
the goods are not fundamentally important to life, this effect of a patent system 
has little opposition.
61
  However, when the invention is fundamental, such as 
pharmaceuticals or life-sustaining goods, it is highly debated whether this is an 
acceptable casualty of a patent system.
62
  In this analysis of South Africa’s patent 
system, access to essential medicines for HIV/AIDS is of particular importance in 
determining whether South Africa’s patent system is detrimental to the health and 
welfare of its people.      
3. Human Rights Concerns 
a.  HIV/AIDS & Access to Essential Medicines 
One of the strongest arguments against a patent system is evident when that 
system disregards the most fundamental human right, the right to life.  In South 




 See generally 1 MOY, supra note 28, §§ 1:31, 1:32; Schaafsma, supra note 48 at 246–47. 
55
 See generally Corinne Langinier & GianCarlo Moschini, The Economics of Patents: An 
Overview 3–5 (Iowa St. Univ. Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev., Working Paper No. 02-WP 293, 
2002), available at http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_2061.pdf; 1 MOY, 
supra note 28, § 1:32. 
56
 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:32; see generally Langinier & Moschini, supra note 55, at 3–5. 
57
 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:32; see generally Langinier & Moschini, supra note 55, at 3–5. 
58
 1 MOY, supra note 28, § 1:32; see generally Langinier & Moschini, supra note 55, at 3–5. 
59
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Africa’s developing third-world economy, the country’s need for a patent system 
that promotes innovation is evident, but must be balanced with the population’s 
need for basic necessities.   
South Africa, for the past several decades, has been plagued with an HIV 
epidemic that now claims nearly 200,000 lives a year.
63
  Nearly “5.6 million 
South Africans were living with HIV at the end of 2009, including 300,000 
children under 15 years old.”
64
  HIV prevalence is nearly 18% among 15-49 year 
olds, and the epidemic is almost completely isolated to the African 
demographic.
65
   
Fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been greatly hindered by the cost of 
AIDS medications, including antiretroviral treatments.  In 1996, brand name 
antiretroviral drugs, costing over USD $10,000 per person per year, were far too 
expensive for the majority of people infected with HIV in lower- and middle-
income countries.
66
   
However, great strides have been made in reducing the cost of medication.  
Under the TRIPs
67
 agreement, developing signatory countries were allowed a 
transition periods in which to comply with pharmaceutical industries’ rights.
68
  
This allowed developing countries, such as India, to continue to develop generic 
drugs until 2005.
69
  These generic drug companies sparked a price war, causing 
branded drug makers to reduce the price of antiretroviral for developing countries 
throughout the mid-2000s.
70
  As a result of country-dependent tiered pricing and 
international negotiations with branded pharmaceutical companies, the cost of 
antiretroviral treatments in 2011 is down to USD $159 per person per year.
71
  
Though a great improvement in price, “[t]he per capita income of a black person 
                                                        
63
 South Africa HIV & AIDS Statistics, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/safricastats.htm (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2012) (“A computer model made by the Actuarial Society of South Africa, called 
ASSA2008 calculated that the number of people who died of AIDS declined from an estimated 
257,000 in 2005 to 194,000 in 2010.” citing ASSA AIDS Model 2008 Media Release, ACTUARIAL 
SOC’Y OF S. AFR. (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://aids.actuarialsociety.org.za/News-3139.htm). 
64
 Id. (citing UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, UNAIDS (2010), available at 
http://www.unaids.org/globalreport/). 
65
 Id. (“UNAIDS estimated that HIV prevalence was 17.8% among 15-49 year olds at the end 
of 2009.”). 
66
 Reducing the Price of HIV/AIDS Treatment, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2012) (citations omitted). 
67
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
68
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in South Africa is USD $271.”
72
  Living below the poverty line, it is unreasonable 
to believe that they can afford a treatment that is more than half-a-year’s wages 
when they are unable to afford basic necessities. 
The costs of medication combined with extreme poverty are major factors in 
both the spread and mortality rate of HIV/AIDS in South Africa.   
b.  Extreme Poverty 
Nearly 60% of individuals in South Africa are living below the poverty 
income line, encompassing 25 million people.
73
  “[T]he poverty gap has grown 
faster than the economy indicating that poor households have not shared in the 
benefits of economic growth.”
74
   
South Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic and extreme poverty are of great concern 
both to the country and to the world as a whole.  Both of these aspects of South 
Africa’s socioeconomic situation must be considered as both effects of South 
Africa’s patent system
75
 and as a driving force in developing South Africa’s 
patent system to better serve their country.
76
 
C. Regional Patent Systems in Africa 
South Africa has yet to join one of the two regional patent systems in Africa, 
however, there has been speculation for a number of years that South Africa will 
join ARIPO.
77
  The following section briefly discusses the two regional patent 
systems in Africa, the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization 
(ARIPO) and the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI).
78
  Both 
ARIPO and OAPI reflect the allegiance of African countries to the colonial legal 
systems of English common law and French continental law.
79
  Both 
                                                        
72
 Cartilha, REDE SOCIAL, http://www.social.org.br/cartilhas/cartilhaingles003/cartilha009.htm 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2012).  
73
 Craig Schwabe, Fact Sheet: Poverty in South Africa, S. AFR. REGIONAL POVERTY NETWORK 
(July 26, 2004), http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000990/ (“While the poverty rate measures 
the proportion of a region’s population living below the poverty line it does not give any 
indication of how far below the poverty line poor households are.”). 
74
 See id. (“[T]he poverty gap . . . measures the required annual income transfer to all poor 
households to bring them out of poverty.”). 
75
 See infra Part III. 
76
 See infra Part IV. 
77
 Peter James, Regional Patent Systems in Africa, FED’N. INTÉRNATIONALÉ DES CONSEILS EN 
PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE (Nov. 3, 1999), 
http://www.ficpi.org/library/montecarlo99/patentsafrica.html. 
78
 Adebambo Adewopo, The Global Intellectual Property System and Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Prognostic Reflection, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 749, 765 (2002). 
79
 Id.  
10
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organizations, ARIPO and OAPI, are examples of how South Africa could adapt 
their patent system to better reflect the needs of their country and the economic 
and social needs of the region. 
1. OAPI 
The African Intellectual Property Organization was established by French-
speaking Africa, in collaboration with France’s National Institute of Industrial 
Property for registration and grant of industrial property rights.  It was signed as 
an Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property 
Organization on March 2, 1977 at Bangui.  The laws, modeled after the French 
laws of 1844, 1857, and 1909, were originally established under the 1962 
Libreville Agreement (then known as the African and Malagasy Office of 
Industrial Property).  The revised text was signed in 1977 and only took effect in 
February 1982.
80
   
The membership of OAPI includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau.
81
  Members of the OAPI 
agreement also consent to two international conventions, the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty of 1970 (PCT) and the Trademark Registration Treaty of 1973.
82
   
The agreement puts in place common administrative procedures through 
centralization of applications and registration of all forms of intellectual 
property.
83
  The agreement puts in place a uniform system of laws applicable to 
all member states covering: patents, utility models, trademarks and service marks, 
copyrights, and cultural heritage.
84
 
Although OAPI has accepted the PCT, they have adapted their patent system 
to better serve their region.
85
  The PCT’s high requirement for patentability has 
been relaxed in the OAPI to better accommodate the low technological skill levels 
of member states.
86
  The OAPI agreement allows for deferred examination as to 
substance for ten years, then providing for an additional five years of deferment 
for the inventor to prove working of the patent in one of the member states.
87
  
                                                        
80
 Id. at 767 (footnote omitted). 
81
 James, supra note 77. 
82




 Id.; see also James, supra note 77. 
85
 See Adewopo, supra note 78, at 767; James, supra note 77 (discussing the OAPI’s use of its 
own Search report rather than the report generated by a PCT Search Report).  
86
 Adewopo, supra note 78, at 767–68 (footnote omitted).  
87
 Id. at 767. 
11
Pechacek: The Past, Present, and Future of South Africa's Patent System
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
[3:188 2012] THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF  199 
SOUTH AFRICA’S PATENT SYSTEM 
Also, the OAPI agreement allows inventors to file certificates for changes, 
improvements, or additions over the principal patent.
88
   
2. ARIPO 
The ARIPO, when first created on December 9, 1976, was known as the 
Industrial Property Organization for English-speaking Africa.
89
  ARIPO’s 
objectives include studying, promoting, and cooperating “on matters relating to 
industrial property in collaboration with the Economic Commission for Africa, 
WIPO, and Organization for African Utility.”
90
   
The objectives of the organization include: (a) promotion of the 
harmonization and development of industrial property laws and 
matters related thereto, appropriate to the needs of its members and 
of the region as a whole; (b) establishment of such common 
services or organs of harmonization and development of the 
industrial property activities affecting its members; (c) assisting its 
members in the development and acquisition of suitable 




The membership of ARIPO includes: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 




The agreement on the creation of ARIPO and two protocols that member 
countries have enacted currently govern ARIPO.
93
   
The Harare Protocol established a Patent Documentation and 
Information Center in Harare, which provides its members with 
technological information available from patent and patent-related 
documentation and subsequent registration.  The main objective of 
this protocol is to provide a partial solution to the dependent patent 
system by establishing an alternative scheme.
94
   
The protocol provides a procedure for registering, processing, granting, and 
administering of patents on behalf of member countries.
95
  The applicant sends his 
                                                        
88
 Id. at 768. 
89
 Adewopo, supra note 78, at 765; James, supra note 77. 
90
 Adewopo, supra note 78, at 765–66. 
91
 Id. at 766 (footnote omitted). 
92
 Adewopo, supra note 78, at 765 n.64; James, supra note 77. 
93
 Adewopo, supra note 78, at 766 (“namely Harare Protocol and the Banjul Protocol”). 
94
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or her application for registration to their respective national industrial property 
office where the member country will transmit the application to ARIPO.
96
  The 
standards of novelty and inventiveness, under the Harare Protocol, are comparable 
to the requirements found in the patent laws of WIPO/PCT and major 
industrialized nations.
97
   
D. South African Legislative Framework 
South Africa enacted its patent system in 1978 with the Patents Act, 57.
98
  
They also are members of the TRIPs Convention and are signatories to the treaty 
establishing WIPO.
99
   
1. Patentability Requirements 
a. Statutory Requirement 
Under the South African Patents Act, “an invention is capable of protection 
provided that it is new, inventive and is capable of use or application in trade or 
industry or agriculture.”
100
  The Patents Act also distinguished inventions that 
may not be patentable and therefore are not inventions for purposes of the act:  
Anything which consists of— (a) a discovery; (b) a scientific 
theory; (c) a mathematical method; (d) a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation; (e) a scheme, rule 
or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing 
business; (f) a program for a computer; or (g) the presentation of 
information . . . .
101
 
b. Novelty Requirement 
The novelty requirement is defined as anything that “does not form part of the 
state of the art immediately before the priority date of that invention.”
102
  South 
Africa’s novelty requirement is absolute, excluding cases where the “invention 
was disclosed, used or known without the knowledge or consent of the inventor 




 See Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 33(1–4), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 [hereinafter 
PCT], available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf; Adewopo, supra note 78, at 766. 
98
 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., STUDY ON PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 58 (Apr. 





 Id.; see Patents Act, 57 of 1978 § 25(1) (S. Afr.) (as last amended in 2002), available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_files/Patent_Act.pdf. 
101
 Id.; see STUDY ON PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 98, at 58. 
102
 Patents Act, 57 of 1978 § 25(5) (as last amended in 2002), available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_files/Patent_Act.pdf. 
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and reasonable technical trial or experiment by the applicant or patentee or the 
predecessor in title of the applicant or patentee.”
103
   
[P]rior disclosure before the date of filling of a patent application 
is deemed to destroy the novelty of the invention in question. Thus 
such an invention would be deemed to form part of the prior art 
and public domain.  Section 27 of the Patents Act is instructive in 
respect of what is deemed to compromise the prior art.
104
 
2. Patentability Requirements and the Public Domain 
Under the South African Patents Act, “[P]rior art comprises anything that has 
been made available to the public in any manner, prior to the date of application 
of a patent for the invention.”
105
  Public, as defined by the Patents Act, “extends . 
. . outside the borders of South Africa, thus making the novelty requirement to be 
an absolute novelty requirement[].”
106
  South Africa provides no grace period for 
the purposes of patentability; novelty is absolute, except for where the use or 
disclosure is fraud against the rights of the patentee or applicant.
107
  The manner 
in which the novelty destroying disclosure is made to the public is irrelevant.
108
  
Novelty destroying disclosures may include: written disclosures, sale or use, or 
oral descriptions (where the essence of the invention or the novel aspects are 
disclosed at a presentation, conference, speech, or in a meeting).
109
  South African 
case law has interpreted the predecessor to the Patents Act as determining any 





From the enactment of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 until May 1, 
2011, The Companies and Intellectual Property Registry Office (CIPRO) was the 
custodian of all patent applications filed within the Republic of South Africa.
111
  
The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) now performs that 
                                                        
103
 STUDY ON PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 98, at 58. 
104
 STUDY ON PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 98, at 58–59. 
105












 See generally Patents Act, 57 of 1978 § 25(1) (S. Afr.) (as last amended in 2002), available 
at http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_files/Patent_Act.pdf. 
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  Individuals may privately file provisional patent applications, 
however, only a patent attorney may file a non-provisional patent application and 
draft the patent specification.
113
   
A provisional patent application may be filed where the invention has not 
been fully developed and tested.
114
  An individual that files a provisional patent 
application logged with CIPC, complete with a provisional specification, is 
afforded temporary protection for 12 months.
115
  Nationally, the provisional 
application may be extended for an additional three months, for a total of 15 
months from filling the provisional application to complete development and 
testing of the invention and file the non-provisional patent application.
116
  If the 
applicant chooses to accept the three-month extension, the applicant forfeits 
international phase under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
117
   
CIPC requires a patent attorney to file the non-provisional patent application 
for two reasons.  First, a patent attorney is essential to draft a patent specification, 
specifically a definition and description of the invention, which is clear, coherent, 
and concise so that the inventor is provided the maximum protection in their 
invention.
118
  Secondly, South Africa is a non-examining country, meaning that 
CIPC does not investigate the novelty or inventive merit of the invention.
119
  Only 
the application is examined, for formalities only, and the substance of the product 
or process is not verified.
120
  The applicant is responsible for ensuring that the 
application is valid.
121
  However, this doesn’t appear to be an affirmative duty on 
the applicant.  But, if the applicant wishes to verify the validity of their patent, an 
international search is required to affirm novelty.
122
  Such a search may prevent 
                                                        
112
 See Companies Act, 71 of 2008 §§ 185–95 (S. Afr.) available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/Companies_files/CompaniesAct71_2008.pdf. 
113
 Do I Need Assistance to File a Patent?, COMPANIES & INTELL. PROP. COMMISSION,  
http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_FAQs.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
114
 See generally Patents Act, 57 of 1978 § 32(2) (S. Afr.) (as last amended in 2002) (“A 
provisional specification shall fairly describe the invention.”), available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_files/Patent_Act.pdf. 
115
 Do I Need Assistance to File a Patent?, supra note 113. 
116
 See id. 
117
 See id. 
118
 See  Patents Act, 57 of 1978 § 32(3) (S. Afr.) (as last amended in 2002) (“A complete 
specification shall . . . .”), available at http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_files/Patent_Act.pdf. 
119
  See Registration Procedure, COMPANIES & INTELL. PROP. COMMISSION, 
http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_RegProcedure.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (requiring the 
inventor to perform a search to confirm novelty).  
120
 See id. (“If all the formalities have been complied with, the application is accepted.”). 
121
 See generally Patents Act, 57 of 1978 (S. Afr.) (as last amended in 2002), available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/Patents_files/Patent_Act.pdf. 
122
 Id. § 25. 
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future litigation for the applicant’s patent infringement of a pre-existing patent, 
may prevent a finding of invalidity of the applicants patent for lack of novelty, 
and is necessary for any applicant who wishes to commercialize an invention in a 
foreign country under the PCT.
123
 
E. Patent Cooperation Treaty 
The Republic of South Africa joined the PCT on March 16, 1999.
124
  
“Consequently, nationals and residents of the Republic of South Africa are 
entitled to file international applications under the PCT . . . .”
125
  South Africa’s 
entrance into the PCT also enables other member countries to file international 
applications designating and electing a national phase in South Africa.
126
   
F. World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO), formed on January 1, 1995 under the 
Marrakesh Agreement, is a multilateral institution charged with administering 
trade rules among member countries and is the successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
127
  The WTO: 
[S]erves as a forum for trade negotiations, resolves trade disputes, 
monitors the national trade policies of its 153 member countries, 
provides technical assistance and training for developing countries, 




                                                        
123
 See generally id. 
124







 Erika George, The Human Right to Health and HIV/AIDS: South Africa and South-South 
Cooperation to Reframe Global Intellectual Property Principles and Promote Access to Essential 
Medicines, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 167, 173 (2011). 
128
 Id. at 173–74 (footnotes omitted).  The article continues:  
As successor to the GATT, the WTO emerged from a series of trade 
negotiations . . . conducted under the auspices of the GATT. Countries 
participating in the Uruguay Round of GATT created the WTO and in the process 
also achieved a major revision of the original GATT.  Established just after World 
War II, the GATT was widely perceived to be ill-equipped to address the 
complexities of a modern global market. 
The original GATT primarily governed the trade of goods.  The Uruguay 
Round set forth new rules to govern trade in services, relevant aspects of 
intellectual property and dispute settlements, and also included trade policy 
reviews within its negotiated agreements.  As members of the WTO, countries 
receive assurances that their exports will be treated fairly in foreign markets in 
16
Cybaris®, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol3/iss2/3
[3:188 2012] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 204 
 
1. TRIPs Agreement 
The Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs), negotiated in 1994, is an international agreement administered by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).
129
 
The TRIPs Agreement includes rules governing various forms of intellectual 
property including: copyrights, patents, trademarks, geographical names, and 
others.
130
  Due to widely varying standards of protection and enforcement across 
the globe, the TRIPs Agreement sets a minimum threshold of intellectual property 
protection that all members must meet.
131
  This minimum threshold also requires 
member states to grant intellectual property protection without discrimination 
against imported products.
132
   
Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, countries were only obligated to protect 
foreign intellectual property to the same extent that it protected local intellectual 
property.
133
  The TRIPs agreement no longer allows member states to set different 




The WTO in drafting the TRIPs agreement enumerated its objectives for the 
agreement in Article 7: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and 
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
                                                        
exchange for their commitment to extend fair treatment to imports into their own 
domestic markets 
. . . . 
During the Uruguay Round, developing countries negotiated some flexibility in 
implementing their commitments under the WTO. Over seventy-five percent of 
WTO members are developing or least-developed countries.  Special provisions in 
certain WTO agreements recognize the challenges developing countries confront 
and permit longer time periods for such countries to implement agreements and 
commitments.  Also, there are measures to encourage increased trading 
opportunities for developing members, and all WTO members are obligated to 
respect the trade interests of developing members.   
Id. 
129
 TRIPs, supra note 67. 
130
 See id.; see also George, supra note 127, at 174. 
131
 George, supra note 127, at 174–75 (footnotes omitted). 
132
 Id. at 174 (footnote omitted). 
133
 Id. at 175. 
134
 See TRIPs, supra note 67; see also George, supra note 127, at 175. 
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in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.
135
 
a. DOHA Declaration 
A special session of the TRIPs council was called in 2001 due in part to: The 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa’s (PMA) lawsuit 
against the Medicines Act,
136
 the opposition to PMA’s lawsuit by South Africans 
living with HIV/AIDS,
137
 and the momentum generated by a global movement for 
Human Rights
138
 combined with the inquires by United Nation agencies regarding 
the connection between intellectual property and public health.
139
  George states 
that: 
Talks at the TRIPs Council eventually resulted in the adoption of 
the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health at the 
WTO’s ministerial meeting in Doha.  Commonly called the Doha 
Declaration, the Declaration . . . is primarily a product of an 
alliance of countries and communities in the Global South and 
largely reflects the perspectives of developing countries.
140
 
                                                        
135
 TRIPs, supra note 67, art. 7. 
136
 See George, supra note 127, at 182–183 (citing Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. President of the 
Republic of S. Afr., Case No. 4183/98, High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial 
Division).  The PMA, a coalition of the local subsidiaries of several major multinational 
pharmaceutical corporations,  
brought suit in the High Court in Pretoria challenging the South African 
government’s legislative efforts to increase access to medicine.  PMA argued that 
the government’s proposed reforms in the Medicines Act would constitute a 
violation of their rights under the South African Constitution.  The Association 
also argued that South Africa’s statute was in breach of the government’s TRIPs 
Agreement obligations.  
Id. 
137
 Id. at 183.  The human rights opposition to PMA’s suit was lead by The Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC). TAC asserted “that industry efforts to block legislation intended to increase 
access to medicines would threaten their rights to health, dignity, and life.” Id. 
138
 Id. at 188. 
139
 See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The 
Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property on Human Rights: 
Rep. of the High Comm’r, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) (finding that the 
effect of patents on drug price affordability is significant because drugs with generic substitutes 
were much cheaper than those without a generic counterpart.); see also George, supra note 127, at 
188. 
140
 George, supra note 127, at 188. 
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The Doha Declaration asserts that TRIPs member governments must 
implement and interpret the TRIPs agreement in a way that promotes public 
health through access to existing medicines and the creation of new medicines.
141
   
We agree that the TRIPs Agreement does not and should not 
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.  
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPs 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all. 
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to 
use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPs Agreement, which 
provide flexibility for this purpose.
142
   
The Doha Declaration further outlines three flexibilities which member states 
are entitled by right to exercise.
143
  “Each member has the right to grant 
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
licenses are granted.”
144
  “Each member has the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it 
being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
145
  Finally, “the effect of the provisions 
in the TRIPs Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such 
exhaustion without challenge . . . .”
146
 
III. THE AFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PATENT SYSTEM ON THE COUNTRY’S 
DEVELOPMENT 
The current state of affairs in the Republic of South Africa in some regards, 
such as access to essential medicines, has improved significantly in the recent 
decade.
147
  However, continued access to essential medicines is not likely to 
                                                        
141
 Id. at 189. 
142
 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 4, 41 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
143




 Doha Declaration, supra note 142, ¶ 5(c). 
146
 Doha Declaration, supra note 142, ¶ 5(d). 
147
 See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
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continue past 2016 and prices may once again rise to the level seen prior to 2000 
for antiretroviral treatments necessary for those with HIV/AIDS.
148
   
The extreme poverty that South Africa has faced has only gotten worse as 
more of the population slips below the poverty line.
149
 Though this may not be 
directly attributed to South Africa’s patent system or their signatory status to the 
TRIPs agreement, they certainly are contributing factors to South Africa’s 
economic stability.
150
   
Finally, the TRIPs agreement must be scrutinized for its favoritism of 




A. HIV/AIDS Epidemic 
As previously discussed, much progress has been made over the last decade to 
reduce the cost of essential medicines, for example, HIV/AIDS antiretroviral 
treatments, and in-turn increase developing countries’ accessibility to them.
152
  
However, even with the strides made, such drugs are still largely out of reach for 
the 25 million South Africans who live below the poverty line.
153
  And to make 
matters worse, one of the largest factors that has driven essential medicine prices 
down in developing countries will largely cease to exist by 2016. 
Under the TRIPs agreement, signed in 1995, developing countries were given 
a ten-year transition period in which to comply with the agreement.  Particularly 
important for this note are the agreement’s regulations on developing generic 
drugs.
154
 This allowed developing countries, such as India, to continue to develop 
generic drugs until 2005.
155
  The agreement also allowed least-developed 
signatory countries until 2016 to comply.
156
  However, the 2016 date is likely 
insignificant as 80% of the world’s HIV medicines are made in India,
157
 a 
developing country that was only allowed the ten-year transition period.  The data 
even suggests that since 2005, the price for antiretroviral treatments has increased 
                                                        
148
 See infra Part III.A; see supra II.B.3.a. 
149
 See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
150
 See infra Part III.B. 
151
 See infra Part III.C. 
152
 See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
153
 See supra Part II.B.3.a-b. 
154
 See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
155
 See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
156
 Reducing the Price of HIV/AIDS Treatment, supra note 66. 
157
 India’s generic pharmaceutical industry under threat from EU pact, ASIAN BUSINESS 
DAILY, http://asianbusinessdaily.com/2012/02/indias-generic-pharmaceutical-industry-under-
threat-from-eu-pact/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
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significantly, likely adjusting to the reduced availability of generic drugs in the 
marketplace.  In 1996, the cost of first line antiretroviral treatments was over USD 
$10,000 per person per year.
158
  By mid-2001, generic triple combination therapy 
treatments cost as little as USD $295 per person per year.
159
 Between 2004 and 
2008, first line antiretroviral treatments were available for USD $64 per person 
per year.
160
  In 2011, after the compliance of most developing countries to the 
TRIPs agreement, a tenofovir based treatment (a newer generation of 
antiretroviral treatment for AIDS) cost $159 per person per year.
161
  This data 
suggests that as newer generations of AIDS treatments come on the market, 
without downward price pressure exerted by generic pharmaceutical companies, 
brand pharmaceutical companies will continue to price pharmaceuticals as the 
market allows. 
B. Extreme Poverty 
With the poverty gap growing faster than the economy, it is clear that South 
Africa’s economy is moving in the wrong direction.
162
  There is no evidence of a 
direct link between South Africa’s shrinking economy and its patent system or its 
international patenting stance.  However, for the purposes of this article, it will be 
assumed that South Africa’s patent system is at least a contributing factor to the 
country’s current economic condition. 
C. The TRIPs Agreement Favors Developed Nations 
Prior to the Uruguay Round of the GATT, developing member countries were 
strongly against the development of intellectual property protection.
163
  The 
developing countries desired the GATT to remain strictly an international trade 
agreement, as their primary concern was access to the markets of industrialized 
nations.
164
  However, the developed member countries saw a great need for 
enhanced intellectual property protection, and used their leverage to achieve the 
TRIPs Agreement.
165
  The trade-off that took place was this: developing countries 
                                                        
158








 See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
163
 Nadia Natasha Seeratan, The Negative Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on 
Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 SCHOLAR 339, 
352–53 (2001). 
164
 Id. at 353. 
165
 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, National Obligations Under Intellectual Property Treaties: The 
Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 591, 598 (2000) (stating that the U.S. 
engaged in linkage-bargain diplomacy, a negotiation tactic in which developing countries received 
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received greater access to the markets of industrialized countries in exchange for 
the developing countries receiving enhanced international intellectual property 
laws in the form of the TRIPs Agreement.
166
  “For developing countries, this 
trade-off [was] potentially dangerous to their well being,” particularly as it relates 
to pharmaceutical patents.
167
  The result: “the developing countries’ dedication to 
facilitate their economic growth and independence [was] inhibited by the over-
enforcement of intellectual property laws” which favored the developed 
nations.
168
  “Essentially, these countries were forced to either agree to the version 
of GATT including TRIPs, or be excluded from the benefit of GATT entirely.  
Unfortunately, the trade-off placed developing countries and public health policy 
at the whim of the developed countries . . . .”
169
 
IV. PATENT SYSTEM BASED SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION 
A. A Balanced TRIPs Agreement 
The TRIPs agreement is in need of a better balance between rich and poor 
signatory countries.  As discussed previously, the TRIPs agreement was written 
by developed countries for the benefit of developed countries.
170
  The developing 
countries had no choice but to agree to TRIPs if they wanted continued access to 
the markets of industrialized nations.
171
  In the TRIPs agreement, there is a need 
for the inclusion of flexible provisions for developing countries, particularly in 
regards to protecting public health.
172
  The following sections apply the Seeratan 
analysis to South Africa’s socioeconomic situation. 
1. Authority to Amend or Modify the TRIPs Agreement 
Under Article 71 of the TRIPs Agreement:  
The council for TRIPs shall review the implementation of this 
Agreement after the expiration of the transitional period referred to 
in paragraph 2 of Article 65.  The Council shall, having regard to 
the experience gained in its implementation, review it two years 
after that date, and at identical intervals thereafter.  The Council 
                                                        
greater access to industrialized countries); see also Seeratan, supra note 163, at 353 (stating that 
developed countries received enhanced international IP laws via the TRIPs Agreement). 
166




 Id. at 354. 
169
 Seeratan, supra note 163, at 360 (footnote omitted). 
170
 See supra Part III.C. 
171
 See supra Part III.C. 
172
 Seeratan, supra note 163, at 402. 
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may also undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new 




The transitional period ended in 2005, therefore under Article 71 the Council 
has the authority to review the agreement with “regard to the experience gained in 
its implementation” and “in the light of any relevant new developments which 
might warrant modification.”
174
  Certainly, a country’s inability to suppress an 
epidemic like HIV/AIDS due to the country’s extreme poverty and high cost of 
access to medicines is a “relevant new development” that deserves attention and 
flexibility under TRIPs.
175
   
2. Decrease Patent Term 
Decreasing the 20-year patent term required for pharmaceuticals in the TRIPs 
Agreement would greatly benefit developing countries. The current term length 
greatly benefits brand pharmaceutical corporation profits. A shorter term length 
would allow generic drug manufacturers to enter the market earlier and to produce 
and sell generics at a fraction of the price of brand pharmaceuticals, allowing low-
income countries to access these critical medicines much earlier. 
However, it is important to note the importance of a proper balance between 
pharmaceutical patent protection and access to medicines for developing 
countries.  Though the immediate need to get affordable pharmaceuticals to 
developing countries is pressing, it is critical that we not detriment the future for 
the betterment of the present.  If the patent term for pharmaceuticals is over-
reduced, we will get affordable generic medicines to developing countries faster, 
but this is not without cost. 
The danger of reducing patent term is the potential for under-funding future 
pharmaceutical advancements.  Generic pharmaceutical companies are able to 
produce medicines below brand costs because generic companies’ research and 
development costs are significantly less.  Generic companies rely on brand 
pharmaceutical research and once patent protection has expired, they reverse 
engineer the composition of the drug and manufacture it at significant savings, 
some of which they pass on to consumers.
176
  Brand pharmaceutical companies 
rely on their profits from existing treatment generations in order to fund current 
                                                        
173
 TRIPs, supra note 67, art. 71(1). 
174
 Id.; see also Seeratan, supra note 163, at 402 (discussing two changes needed immediately: 
reducing the 20 year patent term, and extending the transition period for developing nations). 
175
 See supra Part II.B.3.a–b. 
176
 What Are Generic Drugs?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understan
dingGenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
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and future research.  The cost to bring a new drug to market in 2010 was 
estimated as high as $1.8 billion.
177
  The danger is that at a certain reduced patent 
term, a pharmaceutical company may decide not to develop a drug at all due to 
their projected inability to recuperate the cost of development.  In which case, the 
world would be trading affordable drugs now for critical life-saving drug 
advancements in the future.   
3. Promote Basic Human Rights 
Health and essential medicines are basic human rights.  Since the 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement, many human rights activists have 
asserted that the TRIPs provision on the patenting of pharmaceuticals violates 
basic human rights by compromising the ability of poor countries to access 
essential medicines.
178
  In August of 2000, a United Nations panel indicted the 
WTO for failing to respect human rights in the implementation of TRIPs, 
specifically its failure in making necessary medicines for deadly diseases 
affordable to poor nations.
179
   
However, the fault may not fall completely on the shoulders of the WTO.  The 
TRIPs Agreement does contain two Articles that were intended to reflect the 
needs of developing countries, Articles 8 and 27.
180
  Article 8 promises to protect 
public health, which “should be utilized to demand that there is an essential right 
to health, and thus essential medicines should be made available, regardless of 
patent laws.”
181
  Article 27 “contains a public health exception to the patent 
requirement which includes the protection of human life or health.”
182
  The public 
health exception, if used, would allow a country with legitimate health concerns 
to deny a patent on a particular drug.
183
  The question that remains is why 
countries, such as South Africa, have not relied on these Articles to protect the 
public health of their countries.  Perhaps developing countries are fearful of 
backlash from developed countries. 
Providing access to essential medicines and guarding basic human rights to 
life can be accomplished in a manner consistent with the TRIPs Agreement.  
Exceptions to patent protection on pharmaceuticals for essential medicines, under 
                                                        
177
 Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s 
Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 204 (2010), available at 
http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v9/n3/full/nrd3078.html.  
178
 Seeratan, supra note 163, at 403–04. 
179




 Id.; see also TRIPs, supra note 67, art. 8. 
182
 Seeratan, supra note 163, at 404; see also TRIPs, supra note 67, art. 27(2). 
183
 TRIPs, supra note 67, art. 27(2); see also Seeratan, supra note 163, at 404. 
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the TRIPs Agreement, can be accomplished through parallel imports and 
compulsory licenses. 
b. Parallel Imports 
Under a parallel imports solution, a country in need of cheaper priced drugs, 
instead of purchasing the drugs from the country of origin, purchases the drugs 
where they are available at a cheaper price.  This solution is allowable under the 
theory of Patent Exhaustion, and cannot be challenged at the WTO as it does not 
violate international law, including a country’s obligation under TRIPs.
184
 
c. Compulsory Licenses 
“Compulsory licenses allow a local pharmaceutical company to manufacture 
generic copies of patented pharmaceuticals at lower prices by forcing 
multinational corporations to issue a license in exchange for a reasonable 
royalty.”
185
  Compulsory licenses fall in accordance with the national emergency 
exception in Article 31 of TRIPs.
186
  However, developing countries that attempt 
to implement compulsory licenses face diplomatic pressure from the 
pharmaceutical industry and developed countries.
187
  The result is that Article 31 
is not utilized as intended, due to fear of reprisal.  This bullying must stop.  
Pharmaceutical companies should not be allowed to dictate whether a developing 
country chooses to utilize compulsory licensing.  
One defense against this bullying is to amend the TRIPs Agreement such that 
a country that chooses to use compulsory licenses for a patent in order to cope 
with a national emergency has no burden of proof.
188
  Effectively, this shifts the 
burden to the patent holder to prove that there is no emergency. 
                                                        
184
 Seeratan, supra note 163, at 405–06. Under patent exhaustion theory, once a 
country/producer has sold a product to another country, it has received the benefit of the patent 
and its rights are exhausted.  Therefore, the country that purchased the product may dispose of it 
as they please, including resale to another country. Id. 
185
 Id. at 406. 
186
 TRIPs, supra note 67, art. 31(b) (waiving requirement to obtain authorization from right 
holder during national emergency); see also Seeratan, supra note 163, at 407. 
187
 Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/28/magazine/look-at-brazil.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
(Brand name pharmaceutical companies have long financed both political parties in the United 
States. Therefore, it is likely that the pharmaceutical industry would use this influence to prevent 
such compulsory licenses from going unnoticed.); see also Seeratan, supra note 163, at 406—07. 
188
 Larry Elliott, Putting Profit Before People, CANBERRA TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at A11; see 
also Seeratan, supra note 163, at 407. 
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B. Work Requirements on Pharmaceutical Patents and Territoriality 
Limitations 
Work requirements require an invention to be manufactured domestically in 
order to receive patent protection.  If the patented invention is manufactured 
outside of the developing country, to receive patent protection within the country 
a petition must be filed requesting a license from the government to manufacture 
the invention domestically.
189
  Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, many developing 
countries imposed work requirements.
190
  However, under Article 27(1) of the 
TRIPs Agreement, work requirements are banned because they prevent patents 
from being enjoyed whether the products are locally produced or imported.
191
  
Though work requirements would greatly promote industry within South Africa, 
the WTO’s economic sanctions for violation of the TRIPs Agreement would 
likely negate any benefit that would come from the work requirements. 
National patent protection is limited territorially.   That is, the patent right 
only has effect in the jurisdiction in which it has been granted.  One method for 
developing countries to play industrial “catch-up” with the developed world is to 
apply territoriality limitations upon a certain industry, e.g., the chemical industry, 
which prevents patenting in that industry for a period of years.  These territoriality 
limitations would prevent non-domestic industries from applying for and asserting 
their patents nationally, which otherwise would slow innovation within that 
country in the given industry. 
C. Elimination of Unilateral Sanctions by the United States 
The WTO in its development of the TRIPs Agreement created the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) as a system to enforce the TRIPs’ intellectual property 
laws.
192
  Though the DSB over time has proven not to be a perfect system, it does 
have the benefit of facial neutrality.
193
  Even with the DSB in place, the United 
States amended
194
 and continued use of their Special 301 laws, laws enacted to 
police intellectual property law throughout the world.
195
  The Special 301 law 
places countries that fail to issue pharmaceutical patents on a watch list.
196
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192
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2(1), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
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Because of this watch list, developing countries may be bullied into issuing 
pharmaceutical patents out of fear that being placed on the U.S. watch list will 
discourage foreign investment and thus act as a sanction.
197
  The unilateral nature 
of the Special 301 laws appears to be in bad faith with the TRIPs Agreement.
198
  
Unilateral sanctions by a country should not be allowed under the TRIPs 
Agreement and developing countries should resist such unilateral pressures. The 
DSB was created to prevent the need for such biased international property law 
enforcement systems and therefore developing countries cannot and should not be 
expected to trust a system that is policed solely by one country.  The TRIPs 
Agreement needs to be amended to clearly address and renounce the existence of 
such unilateral international property law enforcement regimes. 
D. Price Controls (Tiered Pricing) 
The Republic of South Africa has successfully used tiered pricing
199
 to greatly 
reduce the cost of antiretroviral treatments within its country.
200
  However, the 
prices of these treatments are still not affordable for the majority of South 
Africa’s population.
201
  Continued negotiations with the pharmaceutical industry 
is needed to sufficiently address their concerns that low priced drugs provided to 
developing countries will not be re-imported to the industrialized countries, thus 
undermining the existing cost structures.
202
 
E. Increased Global Movement for Human Rights 
Lead by groups such as TAC, The Treatment Action Campaign, the global 
movement for human rights has resulted in decreasing the pressure on essential 
medicine costs in developing countries.
203
  The increased attention on human 
rights concerns in developing countries, greatly accredited to organizations such 
as TAC and the Global Access to Medicines Campaign, combined with bad 
publicity shed on pharmaceutical companies in relation to the South African PMA 






 Tiered pricing is “a system of differential pricing, where pharmaceutical companies charge 
developing countries less than advanced industrialized countries to ensure the patented 
technologies are not priced at unreasonable levels.” Seeratan, supra note 163, at 408—09. 
200
 See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
201
 See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
202
 Seeratan, supra note 163, at 409. 
203
 See supra Part II.F.1.a; George, supra note 127, at 193. “The cost of a triple therapy 
combination of antiretroviral drugs that cost the equivalent of USD $450 dropped to $125 in South 
Africa.”  George, supra note 127, at 193. “[T]he number of HIV-positive women receiving 
antiretroviral therapy increased from 76,000, at the end of 2004 to 251,400 at the end of 2006,” 
sparing 47,700 infants from  infection. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “In South America, prices 
fell by fifty-four percent in fourteen countries.” Id. 
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While the human rights movement has made considerable inroads toward 
affordable essential medicines to developing countries, without continued effort 
these movements may not ensure a sustainable balance between pharmaceutical 
companies intellectual property rights and developing countries obligations to 




The Republic of South Africa has made significant strides over the past 
decade to improve the accessibility of essential medicines to its people.  However, 
the country is still in dire turmoil, essential medicines are still out of reach of the 
majority of the country’s people and the economic outlook for its people has 
actually worsened in the past half-decade.  Though South Africa could continue 
on their current path—which has shown results for human rights, but little for the 
country’s economic condition—the country needs to seriously consider more 
drastic measures.  Some of these drastic measures are suggested above; many 
would be to the detriment of international relationships.  Regardless, South Africa 
requires a proper balance between international relations and internal government 
action focused on the betterment of those living within South Africa.    
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